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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KAMAS VALLEY CO-OP and
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION.
Plaintiffs/Petitioners,
Case No.
vs.

900182-CA

Priority No. 7

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE
FUND.
Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND

I.
This

Court

has

JURISDICTION
jurisdiction

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated. Sections 78-2a-3(2)(a).

II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

In June. 1984 employer/carrier, with ready access to all
relevant medical data, prepared and submitted for agreement by (1)
injured

employee.

Employers1

L.

Reinsurance

B.

Cornell,

Fund).

and

(2)
(3)

Second

Injury

Industrial

Fund

(now

Commission

a

Compensation Agreement setting forth the allocation of compensation
liability between the employer/carrier
Injury Fund on the other.

on the one hand and Second

That agreement was approved for payment

on June 22, 1984 (R. 18) and payments under the same were made by
the employer/carrier and the Second Injury Fund.
The sole issue in this controversy:

Can the employer/carrier

5 (five) years later renege on

that Compensation Agreement and assert as against the Second Injury
Fund an entirely different percentage allocation of liability?

III.
This

case

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE

arose

pursuant

to Section

35-1-78 Utah Code

Annotated which read as follows:
The powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each
case shall be continuing, and it may from time to time
make such modification or change with respect to former
findings, or Orders with respect thereto, as in its
opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records
pertaining to cases, other than those of total permanent
disability or where a claim has been filed as in Section
35-1-99, which have been closed and inactive for a period
of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the
Commission.
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include
interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date when
each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and
payable.
Plaintiff
Section

has

asserted

35-1-69, controls

controversy.

also

that

Utah

Code

Annotated

in the allocation of liability in this

It is the position of Defendant Employers' Reinsurance

Fund that 35-1-69 has no application in view of the Compensation
Agreement referred to above as observed by all parties during the 5
(five) years since the Agreement was executed by the parties and as
approved and ordered by the Industrial Commission.

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The basic pertinent facts in this controversy are not in
serious dispute and essentially may be set forth as follows:
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L.B. Cornell (hereinafter called "applicant") sustained an
industrial accident while employed by Kamas Valley Co-Op
(hereinafter called "Plaintiff") on January 30, 1984.
According to applicant, he was on a short ladder helping
to apply decals when "I slipped on the ladder rather
violently and caught myself prior to hitting the ground,
and immediately I had sharp pains into my hip and
buttocks." (R. 43)
Applicant, upon instructions from Plaintiff, went first to
his chiropractor in the Kamas, Utah area but received no
relief
from his pains
(R. 46).
Applicant finally
requested referral to a medical doctor at the Heber
Hospital, where he was attended for some time by treating
physician. Dr. N.J. Burton (R. 47 & 168). The record of
treating physician. Dr. Burton shows continued care and
examination from date of admission February 7. 1984
through date of discharge February 21, 1984 (R. 168).
That record obviously was at all times available to the
Plaintiff employer, including several references in the
one page Discharge Summary Report to applicant's prior
history of peptic ulcer disease (R. 168).
The same discharge report shows also the referral of
applicant to Dr. Thoen in Salt Lake City for neurological
consultation.
The record shows applicant testified (R. 48, 49) of the
visit to Dr. Thoen, the referral to Dr. Robert Lamb and
finally the surgery performed on applicant's back by Dr.
Lamb on February 24, 1984.
Plaintiff employer accepted compensation liability from
the beginning on this case and paid temporary total
disability benefits from January 31, 1984 through June 12,
1984.
Plaintiff
through
its
carrier
(also called
"plaintiff" hereafter) apparently reviewed its medical
records on applicant and requested a permanent partial
impairment rating from Dr. Lamb. Dr. Lamb's response,
(attached hereto as Addendum 1), contained his overall
evaluation - without any breakdown - of 35% permanent
partial disability.
Plaintiff carrier, on May 30, 1984, requested Dr. Lamb for
a breakdown of the permanent partial impairment rating and
received by letter dated June 13, 1984, Dr. Lamb's opinion
that 50% of applicant's disability was due to his
pre-existing injury. (Addendum 2)
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Plaintiffs thereupon prepared a Compensation Agreement
providing for allocation between Plaintiff and Defendant
of 50% each for a permanent partial disability rating of
35% and secured applicant's agreement to that Compensation
Agreement. The Agreement was then presented to the Second
Injury Fund which on June 22, 1984 approved the allocation
of permanent partial disability to pre-existing conditions
of 17.5% which was 1/2 of the permanent partial disability
agreed upon.
Since the Law requires and since the
Compensation Agreement specifically provided "that this
agreement becomes binding and effective only when it is
approved by the Industrial Commission", the executed
Compensation Agreement was presented for the approval of
Industrial Commission which was obtained on June 22,
1984. (A copy of that Compensation Agreement is attached
as Defendant's Addendum 3).
Pursuant to the approved Compensation Agreement, the then
Administrator of the Second Injury Fund issued Order
Requiring Payment from the Second Injury, which was passed
by the Industrial Commission on June 29, 1984. That Order
specifies payment by the Second Injury Fund of the
pre-existing permanent partial impairment of 17.5% and
further ordered reimbursement to plaintiff's of 50%
Finally, that Order specifically provides as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review
of the foregoing shall be filed in writing within
fifteen (15) days from the date hereof specifying
in detail the particular errors and objections,
and unless so filed this Order shall be final and
not subject to review or appeal. (That Order is
attached as Defendant's Addendum 4).
In early 1988, applicant developed a reoccurrence of his
back pain and discomfort (R. 55-58).
According to his
testimony, he got in touch with the Utah Industrial
Commission who gave him permission to seek Arizona medical
attention. He requested from the Industrial Commission a
reinstatement of medical and other benefits. According to
a letter from Plaintiff's Utah Counsel to the Industrial
Commission dated November 28, 1988 (Defendant's Addendum
5), Plaintiff carrier resumed benefits to applicant and
sought medical reports by way of verification. According
to Plaintiff's November 28, 1988 letter, there was some
medical evidence indicating a new injury to applicant in
January, 1988 which prompted Defendant carrier to deny
liability for any reinstatement of benefits. Moreover, as
late as November 28, 1988, Plaintiffs referred to the
Compensation Agreement as requiring 50% contribution by
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.the Second Injury Fund (defendant herein), thus indicating
Plaintiffs continued intention to honor the provisions of
the 1984 Compensation Agreement it had prepared and
processed for approval and Order by the Industrial
Commission.
Pursuant to the Application for Hearing filed by the
applicant, a hearing was held before the Administrative
Law Judge on February 10, 1989. (R. 39)
After the Hearing, Judge Allen referred the matter to a
Medical Panel to determine whether or not applicant was
entitled
to additional
permanent
partial
impairment
compensation.
The Medical Panel Report (R. 273) did not endeavor to
disturb the allocation already found in the Compensation
Agreement with respect to the 35% permanent partial
impairment agreed upon by the parties other than to say
that there had been no increase in that impairment since
the original Agreement.
Upon receiving the Medical Panel Report, Plaintiffs
asserted, despite their prior Agreement as to allocation
of responsibility, that the Medical Panel's finding of 10%
impairment due to pre-existing peptic ulcer must be
included in the apportionment formula. This assertion was
made despite the fact that full knowledge of the peptic
ulcer was available to the Plaintiffs prior to Plaintiff's
preparation and processing - for Industrial Commission
approval and Order - of the June 22, 1984 Compensation
Agreement (R. 168 - See Dr. Burton's early reports
following
referral
of
applicant
for
treatment
and
subsequent surgery).
Defendant Employers' Reinsurance Fund filed its response
to the claim of Plaintiffs for Amendment to the previously
agreed reapportionment allocation in the Compensation
Agreement (Defendant's Addendum 6).
On October 3, 1989, Judge Allen issued his Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in which he found that
the applicant was not entitled to additional permanent
partial impairment and therefore, that there was no basis
for changing the reapportionment set forth in the earlier
Compensation Agreement (Addendum 7).
Applicant did not file a Motion for Review of Judge
Allen's Order of October 3, 1989 and, thus was precluded
from asserting any claim for additional permanent partial
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impairment. However, on October 11, 1989, Plaintiff filed
its Motion for Review asserting that it was entitled to a
reallocation of the apportionment of liability because of
the Medical Panel's findings (R. 294).
The matter was considered by the full Commission and on
March 5, 1990, the Commission's Order Denying Motion for
Review was issued (R. 303). On April 3, 1990, Plaintiffs
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review of
the Industrial Commission March 5, 1990 Order (R. 306,
309).

V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

It is the position

of defendant

Second

Injury Fund as

There is no legal basis for any award of permanent partial
disability benefits to the applicant.
The Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Administrative
Law Judge dated October 3, 1989 held that applicant was
not entitled to any further benefits as the result of his
industrial accident
of January
30, 1984
(Defendant
Addendum 7). As usual, that Order specified that "any
Motion for Review of the foregoing shall be filed in
writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, . .
and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal." No appeal was taken by
applicant to that Order. In addition, the Order Denying
Motion for Review which was filed by Plaintiffs Kamas
Valley Co-Op and/or National Farmers Union, sustained the
Order of the Administrative Law Judge on March 5, 1990.
Applicant did not appeal that Order; therefore, for that
additional legal reason this Court has no jurisdiction to
change the Order of the Administrative Law Judge denying
any additional benefits to the applicant. (See Retherford
v. Industrial Commission, 739 P.2d 76, 80 (Utah App.
1987); see also Ring v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d
602, 603 (Utah App. 1987).
There is no legal basis, in law or in equity, which will
support
Plaintiffs
renunciation
of
the June,
1984
Compensation
Agreement
prepared
and
processed
by
Plaintiffs
and
Plaintiffs
demands
that
the
said
Compensation Agreement be amended with five (5) years
rectroactivity to provide an entirely different allocation
of liability between Plaintiffs and Defendant Second
Injury Fund.
6

VI.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

APPLICANT'S FAILURE TO APPEAL EITHER THE ORDER OF THE
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE OR THE FULL COMMISSION'S ORDER
DENYING BENEFITS LEFT THIS COURT WITH NO JURISDICTION TO
REVERSE THE DENIAL OF ADDITIONAL BENEFITS TO APPLICANT IN
THIS CASE.
As

indicated

consideration

by

the

above,

Commission

applicant
by virtue

properly

sought

of the provisions of

Sections 35-1-78 Utah Code Annotated, which permits such a reopening
where the applicant believes his prior award to be inadequate due to
changes in his condition.

See Rhodes v. Industrial Commission, 681

P.2d 144 (Utah 1984), (Defendant's Addendum 8). However, following
a Hearing, the submission of additional evidence, and referral to a
Kedical Panel, the Administrative Law Judge issued his Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying any additional benefits
to the applicant (Addendum 7). Applicant did not file a Motion for
Review to the Order of the Administrative Law Judge.

In addition,

following a Motion for Review by Plaintiffs, the full Commission
issued its Order Denying Motion for Review wherein the Order of the
\dministrative
affirmed.
3f

the

statute.

Law

Judge

denying

benefits

to

applicant

was

Again, applicant failed to file any appeal to the Order
Industrial

Commission

Accordingly,

within

pursuant

the

to

period

well

prescribed

established

by
Utah

\dministrative and Workers1 Compensation Law, the Court of Appeals
las

no

jurisdiction

\dministrative

Law

to

Judge

review
and

the

the
full

Orders

issued

Industrial

by

Commission,

respectively, denying additional benefits to the applicant in his
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the

claim for benefits arising out of his 1984 industrial injury.
POINT II
AS BETWEEN THIS DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF EMPLOYER. THIS
CASE INVOLVES A COMBINATION OF TWO WELL RECOGNIZED LEGAL
PRINCIPLES:
1.

The principle of Res Judicata, and

2.

The binding effect of a legal agreement such as
the Compensation Agreement entered into between
Plaintiff
and Defendant
in this case and
approved
along
with
Order
passed
by the
Industrial Commission.

(1) Res
elsewhere

that

Compensation
stated

Judicata.

It

is

established

law in Utah and

the principle of Res Judicata applies to Workers1

as well

as other areas of Utah Law.

in Memorandum

Decision

Case Number

Bailey v. Industrial Commission of Utah:

As this Court

890675-CA, Merrill

J.

(Attached as Addendum 9)

The doctrine of Res Judicata is available in Workers1
Compensation matters. See Larson, Workmen's Compensation
Law, Section 79.72 (1989).
This doctrine has also been recognized by the Utah Supreme
Court in cases such as Buxton v. Industrial Commission,

587 P.2d

121, 123 (Utah 1978); see also Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 733
P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1987).

Professor Larson in his treatise, supra,

states that the normal rule of Res Judicata, which requires identity
or

privity

between

the

parties

to

the proceeding

producing the

decision relied on and the parties in the proceeding in which it is
invoked
doctrine.

applies
He

to

states

compensation-related
further

that

the

application
"classical

Res

of

the

Judicata

doctrine requires identity not only of parties but of issues, and
this requirement is generally respected in cases involving Workmen's
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Compensation."

In this controversy,

there was, of course, total

privity and identity between and among all the parties including the
applicant,
Moreover,

the

employer/carrier

there was

identity

and

of

the

issues

Second

i.e.,

Injury

Fund.

the percentage of

permanent partial disability to be awarded to the applicant and the
allocation of liability as between the employer

(Plaintiff herein)

and the Second Injury Fund (Defendant herein).
Defendant is aware and as this Court said in the Merrill
Bailey case, supra, that:
Application
of Res Judicata must, however, be
harmonized with the continuing jurisdiction of the
Industrial Commission in Workers1 Compensation to
reopen cases and modify awards
And
further:
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted the foregoing language to require "as the
basis of modification, evidence of some significant
change or new development in the claimant's injury or
proof of the previous award's inadequacy."
(Citing
Buxton and Spencer cases, supra).
It should be pointed out that in all of the Utah cases
cited and/or referred to where Res Judicata was held not to apply
and reopening was permitted under the Provisions of 35-1-78, it was
the applicant, who was the principal party involved in the alleged
changes

of

condition

or

changes

in

disability

which

made

original Order or settlement, as the case may be, inadequate.

the
In

this case, applicant believed his back condition to have worsened
since

the 1984 Compensation Agreement and, thus was permitted to

file for additional benefits.
the

Administrative

adequately

Law

compensated

However, the Medical Panel as well as

Judge

found

that

applicant

for his back condition and,

been

thus was not

entitled to any further permanent partial disability award.
9

had

As

mentioned above, applicant did not appeal either the Decision of the
Administrative Law Judge or the Order of the full Commission with
respect to the denial of additional compensation benefits to him.
Therefore, the Order as to applicant is final and the reasons for
permitting
mentioned

reopening
and

Compensation

by the applicant

cited

in the various other cases

have been removed.

Agreement

entered

into

What we have
at

arm's

left is a

length

by

the

employer/carrier on the one hand and the Second Injury Fund on the
other with respect to the allocation of responsibility for not only
compensation

but

medical

Compensation

Agreement

expenses.
setting

Plaintiff

forth

the

prepared

the

allocation

of

responsibility; Plaintiff had all of the available medical records
either in his possession or at his disposal.

As mentioned before,

the Discharge Summary of N. J. Burton, M.D. (R. 168) (Addendum 10),
mentions not only in the provisional diagnosis section but in the
final diagnosis section the "prior history of peptic ulcer disease"
along

with

the

basic

lumbosacral problems.
forth

in

the

questions

with

respect

to

applicant's

In addition, the peptic ulcer history is set

paragraph

entitled

Course

in

Hospital

with

Complications, if any because of its influence upon the medication
to

be

given

to

applicant.

Thus,

it

is

readily

apparent

that

Plaintiffs either knew or certainly are charged with knowledge of
applicant's peptic ulcer disease history which later was referred to
in the 1989 Medical Panel Report as perhaps being responsible for an
additional 10% permanent partial impairment.
For whatever reasons Plaintiffs may have had, the
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Compensation Agreement was prepared and submitted for the approval
of

Defendant

Second

Injury

Fund,

showing

a

50-50

split

of

responsibility for a 35% permanent partial disability rating for the
applicant.

This was done within six months following the accident

and at the time when Plaintiffs had all the information necessary to
make their own determination as to what percentage allocation they
wished to submit to the Second

Injury Fund.

Plaintiffs may have

overlooked the possibility of additional pre-existing impairment as
the result of the information pertaining to the peptic ulcer passed
difficulties of applicant; it may well be that in 1984, no rating
was

accorded

to

such

peptic

ulcer

history.

In any event, the

Agreement was submitted to Defendants with applicant's signature and
Plaintiffs' representative's signature.

The then Administrator of

the Second Injury Fund, for reasons of his own, may have considered
the

allocation

satisfactory

from

his

standpoint

attached his approval to the Compensation Agreement.

and,

therefore,

The Industrial

Commission approved the Agreement on June 22, 1984, after which an
Order was

issued

by the Administrator

of the Second

Injury Fund

(Addendum 7), which Order by its specific language shows that it was
"passed by the Industrial Commission of Utah".
In summary, it is the position of Defendant Second Injury
Fund that as between Defendants and Plaintiffs herein all of the
requirements

of

the doctrine

of Res Judicata

have been met and

indeed were existing at the time Plaintiffs attempted to amend the
Commission's Order and to recalculate the allocation of liability as
between Plaintiffs and Defendant.

Under the rationale of the

11

Merrill Bailey Decision, supra, as well as that found in the Supreme
Court

Decisions

doctrine

in Buxton

clearly

should

be

and

Spencer,

applied

in

supra, the Res Judicata
this case and

Plaintiffs

should not be permitted to rescind or revise some five (5) years
following

approval

Industrial

by all parties and

Commission

of

prepared by Plaintiffs.

the

approval and Order by the

Compensation

Agreement

which

was

Some reference has been made to the Supreme

Court Decision in Alvin G. Rhodes v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d
1244 (Utah 1984), in which applicant was permitted

to reopen and

both applicant and the employer/carrier were given the benefit of
newly discovered pre-existing back conditions previously unknown to
any of the parties involved as well as an additional pre-existing
neurological

impairment,

also previously unknown

to the parties.

Clearly those salient features make the Rhodes Decision inapplicable
to the issue between Plaintiffs and Defendant in this case, wherein
Plaintiffs who prepared the Compensation Agreement were fully aware
of the applicant's peptic ulcer history which history was the same
as that later considered by the 1989 Medical Panel.

To emphasize

the difference between the Rhodes case and the instant controversy
the following is found in the Opinion of the Supreme Court in the
Rhodes case (681 P.2d 1244 at 1248):
In the instant case, Mr. Rhodes' pre-existing back
condition was latent and did not manifest itself
until the Settlement. The record indicates that none
of the settling parties knew of the prior condition.
. . . (See Addendum 8)
Clearly in this case, applicant's peptic ulcer condition
was not latent and it was apparent in all of the Medical Reports

12

particularly,
hospitalization

the

Discharge

following

Summary

after

applicant's

his injury of January, 1984.

believes, therefore, that as between Plaintiffs

initial
Defendant

and Defendant in

this case, the doctrine of Res Judicata applies to the allocation of
liability set forth in the Compensation Agreement approved and later
passed as an Order by the Industrial Commission.
(2) As between Plaintiffs and Defendant, the Compensation
Agreement of June 22, 1984 constitutes a binding contract as to the
allocation of all compensation liability existing at that time.
In addition to the issue of Res Judicata, this controversy
involves the very simple contract issue of the continued observance
by Plaintiff as well as Defendant of the provisions of an Agreement
entered
1984

into more than five (5) years before, i.e., the June 22,

Compensation

Agreement.

That

Agreement

was

prepared

Plaintiff who had access to all the relevant medical

by

information

!

necessary

for

its

preparation,

including

not

only

the

relevant

information necessary for applicant's back evaluation and allocation
but also the information clearly setting forth the existence of a

[
prior peptic ulcer history on the part of applicant.

(See R. 168 -

copy attached hereto as Defendant's Addendum 10). That Compensation
Agreement

clearly

was

intended

to

set

forth

the

allocation

of

compensation liability between Plaintiff and Defendant for all of
applicant's pre-existing as well as industrial disability as of that
date.

Defendant

agreed

with

the

proposed

allocation

made

by

Plaintiff and the executed Agreement was submitted to and received
the approval of the Industrial Commission.
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Indeed, it was later

reduced to Order passed by the Commission insofar as the allocation
of responsibility was concerned.

The Agreement was observed by both

Plaintiff and Defendant in making the required payments.

The record

shows that as late as November 28, 1988, Plaintiffs referred to the
Compensation Agreement
requiring

by letter

50% contribution

Addendum 5).

to the

by Defendant

Industrial Commission as
Second

Injury Fund

(see

Finally, it should be pointed out that the ultimate

outcome as well as the final determination of the case was that
there had been no increase in the impairment or disability of the
applicant

since

Agreement.

the

Under

that Plaintiffs1

date

of

the

June

22,

such circumstances. Defendant
attempt

1984

Compensation

strongly

believes

to reallocate liability between Plaintiff

and Defendant at this late date is improper, if not unconscionable.
That

the

Law

generally

encourages

settlements

recognized in Utah as well as throughout the country.
v.

Industrial

Commission,

applies in Workers1
in Utah

there

P.2d

at

1248).

(See Rhodes

Obviously,

this

Compensation settlements, particularly whereas
provision which requires

Industrial

Commission's approval of any such Settlement Agreement.

(See Utah

Code Annotated

is

681

is

a

special

35-1-62).

Obviously, as held in the Rhodes case,

once Commission's approval is obtained such a Settlement Agreement
assumes the same statute as a Commission award.

See also Larson,

Workmen's Compensation Section 82.60 where it is stated:
If the Settlement is approved, it takes on the
quality of an award, and the parties can no more back
out of it than out of any other kind of award.
Such language is particularly applicable as between an
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employer

(Plaintiff herein) and the Second

Injury Fund

(Defendant

herein), where the liability allocation is specifically agreed upon
in view of the medical data existing at that time and available in
this case to the employer/plaintiff.

It has been determined in this

case that there has been no change of conditions with respect to the
permanent partial disability of the applicant since the date of the
injury and the date of the original Compensation Agreement of June
22, 1984.

Thus, we do not have in this controversy the change of

conditions

which

have

formed

the

basis

for

the

reopening

of

Commission awards in all of the prior cases referred to by the Utah
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

In addition, we do not have

in this case the principal item referred to in the reopening of the
Rhodes

case,

i.e.,

a

pre-existing

condition

that was

completely

unknown to all of the parties at the time the original Settlement
was

executed.

In the Rhodes case, half

of the applicant's 20%

permanent partial back impairment was a pre-existing condition which
was

latent

and

Settlement".
(see

not

manifest

itself

until

after

the

In this case, it is clear from the medical records

Addendum

applicant's

"did

10

from

pre-existing

applicant's

treating

physician)

back history available

also his pre-existing peptic ulcer history.

that was

to Plaintiff but

Thus, Plaintiff had all

the necessary information for the preparation of the Compensation
Agreement which he submitted for applicant's approval and then for
the approval of Defendant Second Injury Fund.
the

Agreement

was

approved

after

review

by

As mentioned before,
the

Defendant

forwarded to the Industrial Commission for its final approval.

15

and
It

has already been determined that there were no conditions which were
changed
his

or which

industrial

Agreement.

increased Plaintiff's permanent

impairment after

injury or after the execution of the Compensation

Accordingly, there is no legal basis and there is no

basis in justice to permit Plaintiff to reopen the case five (5)
years later and attempt to alter the reapportionment formula which
it presented to all the other parties and the Industrial Commission
for

approval.

Plaintiffs

should

be

bound

by

the

terms of his

contract either by virtue of Res Judicata or by means of observance
of simple but uniform rules of contract law.

VII.
Plaintiffs
Commission

have

jurisdiction

Annotated

as

a

means

CONCLUSION

attempted

provisions
of

to
of

avoiding

utilize

Section
the

the

continuing

35-1-78

terms

of

Utah
a

Code

contract

(Compensation Agreement) prepared by Plaintiff and submitted to all
parties, including the Defendant and the Industrial Commission of
Utah, for approval and execution five (5) years before.
determination
conditions

has

been

made

that

since the execution

there

has

been

no

A final
change

in

of that Compensation Agreement on

June 22, 1984; there has been no mutual mistake of fact which under
ordinary contract principles conceivably would call for recision or
revision

of

that

contract.

That

contract

was

approved

by the

Industrial Commission of Utah and subsequently became an Order of
the Commission.
Plaintiff

(Addendum 4).

It is the position of Defendant that

is bound by the provisions of that contract by the well

established
16

legal principle of Res Judicata as well as by application of simple
but well established rules of contract law.

Plaintiff1s Petition to

this Court, therefore, should be dismissed and the Decision of the
Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this _<?

i
day of November, 1990

Erie V. Boorman, Administrator
Employers1 Reinsurance Fund

17

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of
Defendant's Brief were mailed this

day of November, 1990. to

the following:

Henry K. Chai II. Esq.
SNOW. CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P. O. Bo# 45000
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P. O. Botf 510250
Salt Lake City. UT 84151-0250

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By.
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator
Employers' Reinsurance Fund
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ROBERT K L A M B , MXX
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY
ST MARK S OFFICE BUILDING 4A
1220 EAST 3 9 0 0 SOUTH

S A L T LAKE CITY, U T A H 8 4 1 2 4
TELEPHONE (801) 262-6486

May 24, 1984

National Farmers Union Life
300 South 564 East
Salt Lake City, UT
RE: L.B. Cornell
Gentlemen;
I think that the fusion which Mr. Cornell had in 1968 predisposed
the early wear and tear of the disc space above the fusion. He also
had a pseudoarthrosis of the L4-5 disc space which was decompressed
during his recent surgery in February.
This patient has a 35% permanent partial disability of the man as a
whole.
If I can furnish any further information regarding this patient, please
let me knowf
Sincerely yours,

Robert H. Lamb, M.D,
RHL:lc
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ROBERT H. LAMB, M.O.
ORTHOPA60IC S U f l G E H r
ST MARK S OFFICE 8UU.OING, 4A
1220 6AST 3900 SOUTH
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H 8 4 1 2 4
TELEPHON6 (801) 262-8466

June 13, 1984

Mr. Robert S. Jackson
National Farmers Union Life
300 South 564 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
RE: L, B, Cornell
Dear Mr. Jackson:
We are i n receipt o f your l e t t e r of May 30, 1984 regarding Mr.
C o r n e l l . You asked f o r a r a t i n g percentage assessed to the preexisting injury.
I feel that 50% of his d i s a b i l i t y i s due to
his p r e - e x i s t i n g i n j u r y .
I f I can be of f u r t h e r h e l p , please l e t me know.
Sincerely yours,

Robert H. Lamb, M.D.
RHL:lc

c,*!c

s<\)
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VI7

\ » W ^ « »w»%»»

B_KON_ THIS INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Of UTAH
LI.

CORNELL
(Applicant*

KAHAS VALLEY COOP

Com^asATtuN
ACIIICKflMfT

(Kaployor)

NATIONAL FARHCTS UNION INS.
(Insurance Carrior)
Oofofwiont

_M»QKA_.
**• ** CQWNCLL
_____in«d 4 pwr_«m*«l i n j u r y by
acsidont arising out of or m tho cuurvo of hio m»p l a y o u t on that 30th
day of
J_ai__*_.* i * J _ whilo o-ployod by
)UN__ Yallgy CtfUB
which accidont has boon July reportod ta tha tttduutriai Cooonssion of tho Stata of
Utah. According to thu phytic ion'* reports and agreoaont botwoon tha p a r t i e s horot o , said Applicant
_us.tainod, as 4 rooult ol :;aid occidont« t««porary t o t a l
ina b i l i t y and/or pomauotit partial d i s a b i l i t y ,
aa w i l l as incurring nodical
and/ar
h o s p i t a l osponsot:. as horoinaftor sot forth:
1-31-84
Tuaporary total disability ff
* • 6-12-**
payable at tho rate of 1 300.00 oor w««k tor a total of I 3.700.00
has boon incurrod and tho carrier/*** loyor ha* paid a total of *J___L_flL
M
of which tho following amount was taswd: I
-O.
2.

weeks payable at tho rata of
'Permanent partial -Inability bwuvd on
S4.fi
1200.00
por wuvk beginning
ft-13-84
tor a total of t 10.o?n,nn .
and t
Q
hoe boon OUW.UKUU thwntutto of which t
fl
was
tamed
Said permanent partial d i s a b i l i t y c o n s i s t s of tho *pecific loss as
follows:
17 jw aorcaor poxa
17.32

3.

•I. diooblity— duo to- book—la

are—»iaglng

dt__hLlt_v

locapitulation of compensation bone*its paid in connection with this claim:
(at

(b)

(c)

Nodical* Hospital and ftiscnllaneou* iiw-ut red J 10,602.20
P u d lu date
«l2lML___Z
Valance (it any* -too
Total W*«>kly Compensation (hmnfitu due
116.820.00
raid to data t 5,700*00
OaUiKu ( it .uiy) duo
Total Nodical and Compenuat ion duo fn.T this Co«p«*nuat ion
Agrevmont:

I

t 10,920.00
'
% 10,920.00

NUW TIIKKthOWK. in cons iderat ion of tlw |*_yMuiit ot the imounts ;t tU-U in
Section J abovo u_ provided by law- tho Applt«:.utt hurcby acrupts tho cu<»p«ti*,ji urn
and Nodical paymonl:: |*aid to data uul agrees wttlt tho p«ii*n»m«Mt partial disability
rating shown above
However, ttio Industrial Commission ot Utah .holt retain
continuing jurisdiction to modify awards .is provided by law. Nodical *>4p«*ti_cc
incurred as tho result of thtt industrial acenhftt aro Ut_ continuing obligation <»t
tho insurance cai rier or employer.
It is und«;rt*to«Mi that this agr*«*w»*tt becomus binding and effective only wh^n
it is approved by tho Industrial COMMITS ion.

tAvey

Hf

Appt'ootnl I hi

Si

V%

• _uon.»rt itir.

NATIONAL FAJtMOtS UNION I N S . / CAMAS VALLEY
;ir.i«.«CwrY o l lii^ui^iici* Cari'iwr/KnployvrCOOf

^

- - / Claisis Manage

•dir.tT. _onlfnct*

»»t fw»<-Oj.>Q«*ni J».M*t \.%\ ttiuatM 1 i t / .out t

••Afrt.lCANT UlHlUtJI t*tt>. THAT cnjm»KNSATI«NI l_ TAt WATT
StCTIO- »b, UHlThll STATKS COU<.

aceooiPMny

thin

\+* U>.CTIUN *314 ( A M / } 0 *

O r i g . w i l l bo nMonwnl t o rat-ri«-r/«^o»luy^r -wol -.»gm-d cupy t o uwploy«-o.
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Addendum 3

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No.

NA

L. B. CORNELL,
*
Applicant,
ORDER REQUIRING PAYMENT

vs.
KAMAS VALLEY COOP and/or
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION INS.
and SECOND INJURY FUND,

FROM THE SECOND INJURY FUND
*
*
APPROVED FOR PAYMENT
SECOND ifcJURY/^NO^

Defendant.
* *

* * *

* *

* * * * *

WHEREAS, on or about June 22, 1984, the applicant in the above-entitled
matter, L. B. Cornell, caused a Compensation Agreement to be filed with the
Industrial Commission and the same indicated that the Second Injury Fund might
be responsible for permanent partial disability benefits, and
WHEREAS, the carrier has paid temporary total compensation and medical
expenses on behalf of the applicant for an industrial accident sustained on
January 30, 1984, and
WHEREAS, the applicant has sustained a 351 permanent partial impairment
of the whole body with 17.51 due to the aggravation of a pre-existing
condition which is the responsibility of the Second Injury Fund, and
WHEREAS, the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund has reviewed the
file, and pursuant to Section 35-1-68 (1) (a), the applicant is entitled to
compensation for a 17.51 pre-existing impairment, and further the carrier
shall
be
liable
for any percentage
of permanent physical
impairment
attributable directly to the industrial injury only.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Second Injury Fund prepare the
necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as custodian of the Second
Injury Fund, to pay to L. B. Cornell compensation at the rate of $200.00 per
week, for 54.6 weeks or a total of $10,920.00, as compensation for a 17.51
permanent partial impairment attributable to pre-existing conditions, said
benefits to be paid commencing July 5, 1984.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that reimbursement shall be based upon a 17.5/35
or 501 apportionment.
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L. B. CORNELL
ORDER REQUIRING PAYMENT
PAGE TWO

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall
be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof specifying in
detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed this Order
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Gilbert4 A. Martinez, /'Administrator
Second Injury Fund

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this
c^T^day of June, 1984.

ATTEST:

Linda J. Str^sbtfrg
Commission /Secretary
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V

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on

-g»

a copy of the attached

ORDER

Qj,As

£-

» 19

84

^

was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:

L. B. Cornell, 5328 East Taylor, Phoenix, AZ 85008
National Farmers Union Life, 300 South 564 East, SLC, UT 84102
Industrial Commission

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By

Madelyn
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LAW OFFICES

SNOW, C H H I S T E N S E N & MAHTINEAXJ
ftCCO L. MAOT1MCAU
STUAirr u POCLMAN
PAYMONO M. BCPPY
M. jAMCS CAXGC
M m

N

p. L Y M C P T

OAViO w, SLAOLC

HCNPY A. CMAI <l
SPYCC 0. PANZXP
JOOY * •UPNCTT
STANLEY K. STOU.
OAvo J. CASTLCTON
PAMCiA G. MCTCftNAM

A, OCNNIS NORTON

OAVIO V* StAUGHTCP

A U A N L. LAHSON

STAHCCY J . PPCSTON

JOHN t

THOMAS M. XAPP

GAITS

P. • « C N T STCPMCNS

P. SCOTT HOWCLU

MtCMACL P. CAPCSTON

SHAWN C OPANCY

GCOPOC A. MONT

JCPPY O. "CNN

CkUOTT J . WIUiAMS

CPAlO U BAPlOW

OAVIO 0 , VWUUAMS

JOHN P. LUNO

MAOSCN

E X C H A N G E P L A C E , E L E V E N T H FLOOR
P O S T O F F I C E BOX 4 S O O O
_
_
- -.._
SALT

LAKE

CITY,

UTAH

SAIAS

TCLCPHONC (801) 5 2 1 - 9 0 0 0

#

,

THUPMAN A SUTHCPtANO
THUPMAH, *uTnrPtANO« KINO
THUPMAM, v c f j w r o o 4 irvtNr
, 19O6
IPAiNC, LAtZM i TS um AN
'
1923
SKCCN. THuPMAM, *OPSL*f « » N d * ' I9S2
WOPSLCT SNOW * C*«tSTCN«CN
I9«7

TCLCCO^CH (SOU 3 6 3 - 0 * 0 0
J O M M

November 28, 1988

JOY L. SANOCP9

MM P. WILSON

wot c

, 0

^

or

$ N O w

,

9 l 7

.

l 9 a 0

COUNSCU

joscrn rov,«x
GCO^Q* N. uAe.scN

P V A * c. n a s i r r s

MAX O. WMCCLCM

ANMC SWCNSCN

PAUL J . OPAT

AMONeW M MOPSC

WWlTCP'S OlPCCT NUMSCP

PAUL C 0 * Q 2

PICHAPO A. VAH WAGONCft

H1CNACL O. St-ACKSUPN

OAVIO W. STCFFCNSCN

POSCWT M. MCNOCASON

LAPPY P. LAYCOC*

STCPNCN POTH

POSCPY C

OCNNIS C. r t P G U S O N

CUZASCTH KING 8PCNNAN

322*™9133

KCLLXP

OAMIAN C. SMITH

OANICL 0 . H I U .

STCPHCN J . H I U .

SAPSAPA J . OlCKCY

• P U C C H. JCNSCM

JOHN U W O 0 0

Barbara Elicerio
Industrial Commission of Utah
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580
Re:
Inj:
Emp:

L.B. Cornell
01/30/84
Kamas Valley Co-op

Dear Ms. Elicerio:
We represent the employer and its insurance carrier in
this matter.
Defendants admit that the Applicant sustained an industrial accident on January 30, 1984. Benefits were paid pursuant to a Compensation Agreement approved by the Industrial
Commission on June 22, 1984.
In 1988 Applicant requested a reinstatement of benefits.
Defendants conditionally began paying benefits on January 31,
1988. Since Mr. Cornell was living in Arizona, he selected
Dr. David A. Rand to provide his examination. On September
15, 1988, Dr. Rand concluded that the present symptoms of
Mr. Cornell are not related to the industrial accident, but
rather to a new injury occurring in January, 1988. Based upon
Dr. Rand's opinion, benefits were terminated in September, 1988.
Because these benefits were paid for a period related to a new
injury and not to the original industrial accident, Defendants
are entitled to an offset of the 1988 payments against any
further benefits that may be awarded.
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Barbara Elicerio
November 28, 1988
Page two
Defendants deny all allegations not specifically aclmitted,
Since 50% of the Applicant's back impairment is related to
pre-existing conditions, the Employer's Reinsurance Fund should
be joined as a Defendant.
Before this matter is scheduled for a hearing, the Applicant
should be required to submit medical evidence connecting his
recent problems with the industrial accident. As already mentioned , Applicant's last treating physician did not relate his
problem to the industrial injury.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTEN SEN & MARTINEAU

Henry K^CJrai
HKC:aw
cc:

L.B. Cornell
Sandra Southern
Erie V. Boorman
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State of Utah
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman
Thomaa R. Carlson
CommiMionvr
Dixie L. Minson
ComnuMioner

P 0 Box 510910

Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

Salt Lake Oty. Utah 84151-0910

(801)530-6880
ToN Ft99 1-800-426-0667
FAX 801-530-6804

November 6, 1989

Timothy C. Allen
Administrative Law Judge
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P. 0. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
Re: L. B. Cornell
Inj: 1/30/84
Emp: Kamas Valley Co-op
Dear Judge Allen:
I have reviewed your October 3, 1989 Order in the above-entitled
matter. I have also reviewed Mr. Chai's letter moving for the review of your
Order and his request for an Amended Order. I note also that the applicant
has made no motion for additional impairment in opposition to your Order of
Denial and therefore, any application for increased benefits to the applicant
appropriately is foreclosed as of this day. The same rationale, of course,
applies to the suggestion by Mr. Chai that applicant appropriately is entitled
at this stage for additional pre-existing impairment.
With respect to the remainder of Hr. Chai's request as to a
reallocation of compensation liability as well as reimbursement liability, I
know of no authority which will permit the employer/carrier responsible for
the original Compensation Agreement to recant on that agreement on the basis
of a medical opinion issued more than five and a half (5 1/2) years after the
injury and more than five (5) years after the execution of the Compensation
Agreement.
It appears clear from the correspondence from the carrier* s
representative to Dr. Robert H. Lamb, that every effort was made to get a
complete allocation insofar as pre-existing condition was made and that the
Compensation Agreement was then prepared by the carrier, incorporating its own
conclusions as to the appropriate liability of the employer/carrier on the one
hand and the then Second Injury Fund on the other hand.
Under such
circumstances, it is unconscionable at this time for the carrier now to
retrace its steps and attempt to get an entirely new evaluation and allocation
of responsibility.
In addition to the above position, it should be pointed out that the
so called hearing loss referred to as being a pre-existing condition in fact
was experienced within a short time of the examination made in 1989.
Accordingly, that loss would not qualify under any circumstances as
pre-existing the 1984 industrial injury.
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Judge Allen
November 3, 1989
Page Two

In conclusion, it is the position of the Employers9 Reinsurance Fund
that the employer/carrier is bound by the Compensation Agreement which it
prepared and processed for execution by all parties, including the applicant
and the then Second Injury Fund, and for ultimate Order by the Industrial
Commission dated June 29, 1984, insofar as it applies to the compensation and
reimbursement
rights and benefits of the parties hereto and that the
employer/carrier properly cannot attempt to revise those figures on basis of a
1989 Medical Panel examination. Therefore, we respectfully submit that your
Order of October 3, 1989 should remain unmodified as it was issued.

EVB/tn
cc: Henry K. Chai, Atty., P. 0. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 88000896

*
*

L.B. CORNELL,
Applicant,

FUTOIHGS OF FACT
*
*
*
*

vs.
KAHAS VALLEY CO-OP and/or
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW^vAND ORDER

7 ^

*
Defendants.
*

/#f

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334f Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 10,
1989 at 8;30 a.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant
to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

L. B. Cornell, PRO SE.
The defendants were
Attorney at Law.

represented

by

Henry

K. Chai,

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was taken
under advisement and referred to a medical panel by the Administrative Law
Judge.
The medical panel report was received and copies were distributed to
the parties.
Fifteen (15) days having elapsed since the mailing of said
medical panel report, and no objections having been received thereto, the
medical panel report is admitted into evidence.

FINDINGS OF FACT:
In October of 1980, the applicant was hired by the Xamas Valley Co-op
as its general manager. The co-op is owned by farmers in the Kamas Valley
area and is Intended to provide livestock feed and other services to its
members•
On January 30, 1984, the applicant was helping prepare a field
delivery truck, and towards that end was applying decals to the truck. He was
using a 4 f step ladder, and was applying a decal on the side of the truck,
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L.B. CORNELL
ORDER
PAGE TWO

when the ladder slipped and he started to fall. Hr. Cornell was able to avoid
falling to the ground by grabbing hold of a railing on the truck. As he did
so, he had an immediate sharp pain in his right hip and buttocks, which
radiated across his back and down his right leg to his foot. The applicant
testified that ha thought he had dislocated something. The following day he
reported to Dr. Kelly Jarvis in Heber City for chiropractic treatment. The
chiropractor performed an x-ray and daily chiropractic manipulation upon the
applicant for the next week.
The applicant testified that following each
adjustment, his condition worsened.
Following the seventh treatment, the
applicant could hardly walk, so Dv. Jarvis drove him to the Wasatch County
Hospital on February 7, 1984. At that time, the applicant was seen by Dr.
Burton, general practitioner, who prescribed physical therapy and Feldene.
The applicant testified that each time following a physical therapy session in
the hospital, he had to be wheeled back to his room. He continued this course
of treatment until February 21, 1984, when he was discharged from the
hospital. On February 22, 1984, he was admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital
and the following day received a CT scan and on February 24, received a
laminectomy at L3-4. The applicant was also informed that there was psuedo
arthrosis at L4-S by Dr. Lamb.
Following the surgery, the applicant was
eventually released by Dr. Lamb on June 12, 1984, to return to work.
Since the applicants position was a working position, he did not
return to that employment. Rather, he moved to Oklahoma and started selling
land.
On January 22, 1985, he was having some tightness in his back, so he
reported to Dr. Butler in Oklahoma City. The doctor referred the applicant
for physical therapy and the applicant reports that his condition improved as
a result of that treatment. He continued selling land in Oklahoma until the
oil market bust of approximately July or August of 1987. The applicant
returned to Arizona in January of 1988.
In the course of moving to Oklahoma to Northern Arizona, the
applicant noticed that the long drive started to bother his back. He noticed
that each time he would leave his car, he would have more and more difficulty
straightening up.
By the time he reached Arizona, his condition had
deteriorated. He contacted the Industrial Commission and was informed that he
would need a change of doctor to receive medical treatment in Arizona. After
the applicant went the rounds with the Industrial Commission, he finally
decided to come to Salt Lake himself, and see Dr. Lamb rather than undergo any
further delays in receiving the necessary authorization to see Dr. Eskay in
Arizona.
The applicant saw Dr. Lamb on March 26, 1988, and at that time
received a CT scan at Western Neurological Associates. Dr. Lamb ruled out
further surgery, gave the applicant pain medication, and told hia he would
need an EHG from Dr. Thoen. The applicant returned home and a week later came
back to Salt Lake City and received the nerve conduction study from Dr.
Thoen.
At that time, the applicant was informed by his adjustor that they
would require a second opinion following Dr. Lamb's examination, and that the
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ORDER
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a p p l i c a n t should take a l l of h i s x-rays home with hia* The applicant was a l s o
p l a c e d on temporary t o t a l compensation benefits commencing e f f e c t i v e March 26,
1988.
Dr. Lamb, upon hearing that an IMS would be performed, informed Hr.
Come LI t h a t no further treatment would be provided u n t i l the independent
medical examination had been accomplished.
On May 23, 1988, the applicant was s^n
by Dr. Rand for the
independent medical examination.
He informed Dr. Rand that he had been
keeping a low p r o f i l e with respect to h i s a c t i v i t i e s , and that as the r e s u l t
he f e l t b e t t e r .
Dr. Rand informed the applicant that he was releasing hia for
l i g h t duty and that he should increase his a c t i v i t i e s as he could tolerate
them.
The applicant tried riding a three-wheeled vehicle to move some
s p r i n k l e r s on a f r i e n d ' s ranch, and was only able to do that for three days
without having further problems. He returned to Dr. Rand one month later, and
r e p o r t s t h a t he was in worse shape that he had been in i n i t i a l l y . Dr. Rand
then informed the applicant that he would need a myelogram to rule out the
need f o r s u r g e r y . At t h i s point, the applicant t e s t i f i e d that he informed the
doctor t h a t Dr. Lamb had already had a CT scan performed and had rjied out
surgery p r e v i o u s l y . Dr. Rand informed that the applicant that he would s t i l l
n^d an enhanced CT scan and a myelogram which might show some problem not
i d e n t i f i a b l e on a regular CT scan.
The applicant was h o s p i t a l i z e d at the John C. Lincoln Hospital in
Phoenix, Arizona for the period July 28 through July 30, 1988.
Dr. Rand
informed the applicant that he could find nothing wrong with h i s back and that
he did not understand what the a p p l i c a n t ' s problem was. He instructed the
a p p l i c a n t to return in five days to h i s . o f f i c e .
The applicant did so, and on
August 4 , 1988, the doctor reaffirmed that the myelogram was negative and that
the a p p l i c a n t should return home and report back to the doctor in one month
f o r f u r t h e r f o l l o w up. The applicant contacted his adjustor and complained
about Dr. Rand and requested permission to see another doctor. The adjustor
informed t h e applicant that she was in the process of having his case
e v a l u a t e d by the Arizona' Rehabilitation Department, and was considering a
permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y dependent, of course, upon the rehabilitation
report.
She
further informed the applicant that he should keep h i s
appointment w i t h Dr. Rand. The applicant returned to Dr. Rand on December 15,
1988, and a t t h a t time the doctor informed the applicant that he did not have
anything wrong with h i s back, but the applicant took i s s u e with this finding
i n d i c a t i n g t o the doctor that Dr. Lamb had already i d e n t i f i e d a bulging disc
a t L3-4 and t h a t the disc was impigning on the applicant's nerve root. The
a p p l i c a n t t e s t i f i e d that he questioned the quality of the doctor 1 s x-ray
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and the doctor apparently took embridge with that challenge.
The a p p l i c a n t l e f t the doctor's o f f i c e on l e s s than amicable terms.
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The a p p l i c a n t , upon arriving homaf indicated that he was rather
heated and contacted the ad jus tor and informed what had happened. She
informed him t h a t she was sympathetic and that she was s t i l l waiting to
s c h e d u l e him w i t h the Arizona Sehabilitation Department. However, she further
informed the applicant that he was not authorized to return to Or, Lamb. On
September 2 9 , 1988, the defendant's wrote the applicant a Letter informing h i s
t h a t pursuant to the report of Dr. Sand no further benefits would be due as
tha r e s u l t of the industrial accident of January 30, 1984. Dr. Sand concluded
t h a t tha a p p l i c a n t ' s problems were not a result of his industrial accident of
January 3 0 , 1984. Thereafter, the applicant had no further medical treatment
u n t i l ha saw Dr. Dowiing on January 27, 1989. Dr. Dowiing has recommended
t h a t tha a p p l i c a n t continue to receive conservative care from Dr. Lamb.
Tha a p p l i c a n t ' s f i r s t back injury occurred in 1968, when he was
c u t t i n g l o s s in Arizona. At that time the applicant had j u s t completed the
f e l l i n g of a large pine tree, and as that tree f e l l to the ground i t
apparently d i s l o d g e d a dead aspen tree. As a result, that tree f e l l as the
a p p l i c a n t was "bucking" branches from the pine tree. The applicant testified
t h a t he was bant over and as he was removing those limbs, the large dead aspen
f a l l a c r o s s h i s back. The applicant eventually received a fusion from 14-31
by Dr. P e t e r s o n at the Southside District Hospital in Heza, Arizona. When tha
a p p l i c a n t moved in January of 1988, he was driving a pick up truck, which
contained boxes of small odds and mds but no furniture.
With the f i l e in this posture, the case was returned to the medical
panel t o determine i f there had been any change in the applicant's prior
r a t i n g of 17.5% of tha whole ^vson due. to the industrial accident of January
3 0 , 1984.
Tha panel found that the applicant has not been temporarily totally
d i s a b l e d as a r e s u l t of the industrial accident of January 30, 1984, beyond
Saptembar 1 2 , 1988. The panel also found that the permanent impairment due to
tha i n d u s t r i a l accident of Jzxuizcj 30, 1984, has not increased beyond the
17.5% of tha whole person previously awarded. The panel also found that there
has bean no increase in the pre-existing lumbar impairment rating of 17.5%.
F i n a l l y , tha panel concluded that future medical care as a result of the
i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t of January 30, 1984, should include reasonable access to
p e r i o d i c orthopedic care. Tha panel concluded that tha "applicant should have
f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n in back care and periodic advise as to management of his
back problem from someone l i k e Dr. Dowiing or her associates who are near
anough t o him both physically and psychologically to be helpful." Tha
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge adopts tha findings of tha medical panel as his own.
Pursuant to the findings of tha medical panel f tha applicant is not
e n t i t l e d t o any further benefits as the result of the industrial accident of
January 3 0 , 1984, at t h i s time.
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ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that tha claim of L.B. Cornell for additional
temporary t o t a l compensation and permanent partial impairment benefits as tha
r a s u l t of tha indixstrial accident of January 30, 1984, should be, and the same
i s hereby dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Hot ion for Review of the foregoing
s h a l l be f i l e d in writing within thirty (30) days of the data hereof,
specifying i n detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
f i l e d , t h i s Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Passed by tha Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Laka<City, Utah, this
S^^J
day of flepteabeg, 1989.
ATTEST:

P a t r i c i a 0. Aahby
Commission Secretary

—'

/
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a copy of tha attachad
ORDSH i n tha casa of L.B. Cornell issuad Tinligiim.L . ?
was mailed to tha
f o l i o wins parsons at tha following addresses, pos^^Tpaid:
L.B. Cornell
P.O. Box 1944
Snowflaka, Ax

85937

Henry X. Chai
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 45000
S a l t Lake City, Utah 4145
Rational Farmers Union
5284 South 320 Wast #C144
S a l t Lake City, Utah 84147
Employers Reinsurance Fund
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rfhKkij $!t£k
Sherry Smith
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"Contradictory testimony alone is not sufficient to disturb a jury verdict To overturn
a verdict on appeal for insufficiency of
evidence, this Court must find that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt"
State v. Watts, Utah, 675 P.2d 566, 568
(1983); State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443,
444 (1983). It is not our function to determine the credibility of conflicting evidence
or the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom. Watts, supra.
[2] We find the record to contain sufficient evidence to identify, beyond a reasonable doubt Bagiey as the burglar and getaway driver at the Rainbo .station. Smith's
inability to immediately identify Bagiey at
the police station can be reasonably explained by his lack of sleep at the time.
Most importantly, his momentary lapse
does not diminish the accuracy of his prior
identifications. Minutes after the burglary
Smith identified the getaway truck at the
scene of the accident The truck was subsequently determined to belong to Bagiey.
At the accident scene Smith also identified
the person whose photograph appeared on
Bagiey's driver's license as the burglar.
Only two hours later he did so again.
Furthermore, Bagle/s own claim that
his truck had been stolen was refuted by
Detective Bnnghurst's testimony. Bringhurst testified that Bagiey told him that
at night he always left his wallet and one
set of keys in his truck and in the morning
used his spare key to get back in. However, at the seen/of the. accident the police
found two ignition keys to the truck on its
front seat When Bagley's girlfriend attempted to retrieve the truck from the impound lot she confirmed that these two
were the only keys to it Thus, even if
Bagiey'3 account of his parking practices
had been believed by the trial judge, the
presence at the scene of the accident of the
only two keys to the truck, including the
spare key that Bagiey stated he kept in his
possession, was highly persuasive in placing Bagiey at the scene and refuting his
claim that his truck had been stolen. Furthermore, the alibi evidence offered by

Bagiey and several of his friends was
vague, self-contradictory and unconvincing.
We hold that there was sufficient evidence
to convict Bagiey of burglary, theft and
filing a false report
[3] Bagiey also attempts to argue that
Smith's in-court identification of him as the
burglar was the result of what he characterizes as the "suggestive" prior encounter
in Bringhurst's office and thus should have
been inadmissible. Bagiey, however, failed
to object to Smith's identification either
before or during trial. We therefore will
not review this claim. Utah R.Evid.
103<aXl); State *. Malmrose, Utah, 649
P.2d 56, 58 (1982).
Affirmed.
HALL, CJ., and OAKS, STEWART and
HOWE, JJ., concur.

ALVIN G. RHODES PUMP SALES and
State Insurance Fund, Plaintiffs,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
and Second Injury Fund, Defendants.
No. 19163.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 26, 1984.
In workmen's compensation case. State
Insurance Fund sought reimbursement
from the Second Injury Fund for medical
and disability payments that State Insurance Fund made pursuant to a settlement
with an injured employee of the insured.
An administrative law judge refused to order reimbursement and the Industrial Commission denied a petition for review. State
Insurance Fund and its insured brought
original proceeding for judicial review.
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The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that
State Insurance Fund was entitled to apportionment between it and the Second Injury Fund of medical expenses, temporary
total disability, and permanent partial disability payments paid to injured employee,
even though the payments were made pursuant to a settlement to which the Second
Injury Fund was not a party.
Reversed and remanded.
Hall, CJ., filed concurring and dissenting opinion.
Howe, J., filed concurring and dissenting opinion.
L Workers' Compensation <fc»1030
Second Injury Fund may be liable for a
part of a workmen's compensation settlement negotiated between an employee and
the employer or its insurance carrier, when
the employee, the employer, and its insurance earner did not know at tune of settlement that the Fund was liable. U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-69.
2. Compromise and Settlement e^l
The law generally encourages settlements.
3. Workers' Compensation <^»1030
The Second Injury Fund can be held
liable for its statutory liabilities in a workmen's compensation case even after the
completion of a hearing to which it is not a
party and the Fund is not insulated from
its liabilities because circumstances giving
rise to those liabilities were not foreseen.
4. Workers' Compensation-^» 1030
Intricate statutory pattern governing
liabilities of the Second Injury Fund to
workmen's compensation insurance carriers should be accorded due protection by
procedural law, which must assure fairness
to the Fund and also give effect to the
basic statutory scheme for allocating liability for the payment of compensation, regardless of whether liability of the Fund is
made pursuant to settlement or pursuant
to an award made after a full dress hearing. U.OA.1953, 35-1-69.

5. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=»669
Questions not raised in an administrative tribunal are not subject to judicial review except in exceptional cases.
6. Workers' Compensation «»1030.1(7)
Second Injury Fund was precluded
from arguing to the Supreme Court that no
workmen's compensation should be allowed
for portion of employee's back injury found
by a medical panel to be due to his chronic
alcoholism, where the Fund raised the issue
for first time in its respondent's brief without having cross-petitioned for review of
the Industrial Commission decision, in its
answer to State Insurance Fund's motion
to review the order of the administrative
law judge before the Industrial Commission, the Second Injury Fund neither disputed the award nor filed its own motion
for review, and no circumstances of injustice compelled review of the issue.
7. Workers' Compensation a=»1030.1(l),
1057
State Insurance Fund was entitled to
an apportionment between it and the Second Injury Fund of medical expenses, temporary total disability, and permanent partial disability payments State Insurance
Fund had paid to injured employee, even
though the payments had been made pursuant to a settlement to which the Second
Injury Fund had not been a party, where
employee's preexisting back condition was
latent and did not manifest itself until after
the settlement, none of the settling parties
knew of the prior condition, and Second
Injury Fund was notified of its potential
liability arising out of the settlement at
earliest possible date. U.C.A.1953, 35-169.

James D. Black, Salt Lake City, Stephen
W. Julien, Cedar City, for plaintiffs.
Gilbert Martinez, Admin. Second Injury,
Frank Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Ind.
Coram.), Salt Lake City, for defendants.
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STEWART, Justice:
In this workmen's compensation case,
the State Insurance Fund ("State Insurance") seeks reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund ("the Fund") for medical
and disability payments that State Insurance made pursuant to a settlement with
an injured employee of the insured. An
administrative law judge refused to order
reimbursement. The Industrial Commission denied a petition for review. We reverse and remand.
The administrative law judge found the
following facts. Wilbur G. Rhodes was an
employee of Rhodes Pump Sales. On two
separate occasions, once on August 15,
1977, and later on May 1, 1978, he injured
his back lifting heavy objects at work.
Back problems and medical treatment ensued, causing Rhodes to miss several days
of work, and causing a permanent back
impairment State Insurance paid for Mr.
Rhodes' medical treatment and missed days
of work as those expenses were incurred.
On approximately July 23, 1980, Mr.
Rhodes signed a written settlement with
State Insurance, in which he (1) accepted
the payments to that date as payment in
full for the medical and temporary disability benefits due him, and (2) agreed to accept $6,676.80 as a settlement for his permanent partial impairment Based on a
medical report the settlement agreement
set the level of permanent partial impairment of Rhodes' back at 20%. At that
time, no party knew that Rhodes had any
pre-existing back conditions. Apparently
for this reason, the Second Injury Fund
was not a party to the settlement
In 1981, Mr. Rhodes filed an application
for an adjustment of his prior claim. He
alleged that his back had deteriorated since
the medical treatment was completed and
thus sought an increased permanent partial
impairment rating. He named Rhodes
Pump Sales, the State Insurance Fund, and
the Second Injury Fund as defendants.
As required by statute, U.C.A., 1953,
§ 35-1-69, the case was submitted to a
medical panel for a medical examination.
The panel found that Mr. Rhodes' back had

not deteriorated from the 20% impairment
level previously determined. The panel allocated the causes of his impairment as
follows:
(1) Five percent for the May 1978 injury;
(2) Five percent for the August 1977 injury; and
(3) Ten percent for "previously-existing
conditions" due to "degenerative arthritis and disk disease of the low
back."
The finding as to the pre-existing conditions arguably made the Fund liable for
part of the previously paid medical and
disability benefits. § 35-1-69.
In addition, the medical panel also found
that Rhodes had a pre-existing 5% neurological impairment known as "sensory polyneuropathy," which was caused by chronic alcoholism that Rhodes had suffered prior to the industrial injuries. Based on
these separate whole man impairment ratings, the medical panel arrived at a combined partial man impairment rating of
24%. See generally Jacobsen Construction v. Hair, Utah, 667 P.2d 25 (1983).
The administrative law judge initially denied Mr. Rhodes' request that his permanent impairment rating be increased. The
judge reasoned that although the new impairment rating of 24% was 4% greater
than the 20% rating agreed on in the settlement the 4% increase was due to a condition (chronic alcoholism) which had existed
at the time of the 1980 settlement Thus,
the judge held that Rhodes was not entitled
to any additional benefits. The judge also
refused to order the Fund to reimburse
State Insurance for medical expenses, temporary total disability payments, or permanent partial disability payments.
Mr. Rhodes and the plaintiffs contested
the order. Rhodes asserted that he was
entitled to a 4% disability rating increase;
the plaintiffs asserted that they were entitled to reimbursement from the Fund
for l5/a of the medical and temporary total
benefits they had paid to Rhodes and
for l%o of the permanent partial disability
that they had paid. After negotiations be-
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tween the parties the judge signed an partial impairment payments had been paid
amended order that (1) increased Mr. by State Insurance pursuant to an adjudiRhodes' permanent partial impairment rat- cated award, § 35-1-69(1) would require
ing by 4%; (2) ordered the Fund to pay Mr. the Fund to reimburse State Insurance for
Rhodes $1,335.36 for the i% increase; and a portion of those expenses. U.S. Fidelity
(3) ordered the Fund to reimburse State & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial CommisInsurance for only 4/24 of the temporary sion, Utah, 657 P.2d 764 (1983); Intertotal disability and medical expenses it had mountain Smelting Corp, v. Capitano,
paid.
Utah, 610 P.2d 334 (1980); White v. IndusPlaintiffs then filed a petition for review trial Commission, Utah, 604 P.2d 478
with the Industrial Commission. In deny- (1979).
ing the petition, the Commission referred
The Fund argues that: (1) § 35-1-69(1)
to the above facts and stated: 'The parties applies only to adjudicated awards, not to
to the 1980 compensation agreement are settlements, and (2) even if that section
bound by the terms of that document and applies to settlements, it does not require
no further changes in the apportionment the Fund to reimburse an employer for
should be permitted."
settlements to which the Fund was not a
party.
On appeal to this Court, State Insurance
argues that the Fund is required by § 35The Fund relies on Pacheco v. Industrial
1-69(1) to reimburse State Insurance. Commission, Utah, 668 P.2d 553 (1983).
That section defines the scope of the The issue in Pacheco was whether the proFund's responsibility:
vision in § 35-1-78, which requires comIf any employee who has previously pensation awards made by the Industrial
incurred a permanent incapacity by acci- Commission to include interest, applies to
dental injury, disease, or congenital caus- settlements as well as to awards. We held
es, sustains an industrial injury for that § 35-1-78 did not apply to settlewhich compensation and medical care is ments, stating:
provided by this title that results in perUnlike an award, a settlement involves
manent incapacity which is substantially
no factual determination by the Commisgreater than he would have incurred if
sion of liability or the amount of damhe had not had the pre-existing incapaciages. In view of this distinction, we
ty, [then] compensation and medical care
cannot presume that the Legislature in. . . shall be awarded on the basis of the
tended the interest provision to apply to
combined injuries, but the liability of
settlements.
the employer for such compensation
Id. at 555.
and medical care shall be for the indusThe present case is distinguishable from
trial injury only and the remainder
Pacheco.
The settlement in Pacheco conshall be paid out of the [second injury
l
cerned
only
the employee and the employer
fund]
[Emphasis added.]
or its insurer. Our ruling that § 35-1-78
The Fund does not contend that the setdoes not require the Commission to award
tlement amounts paid for medical expenses,
interest on a settlement was consistent
temporary total disability or permanent
with an employee's being free to bargain
partial impairment were excessive, nor
for interest on the settlement amount
does it contend that the findings of 10%
[1] In contrast to Pacheco, the Second
impairment due to the prior disk disease
and 5% impairment due to alcoholism were Injury Fund may be liable for a part of a
in error. Clearly, if the medical expenses, settlement negotiated between an employee
temporary total disability and permanent and the employer or its insurance carrier,
1. This subsection has since been amended, but
is stiil substantially the same. See § 35-1-69

(Supp.1983).
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... [T]he Second Injury Fund need not
when the employee, the employer, and its
be a party to every workmen's compensainsurance carrier did not know that the
tion proceeding that may ultimately afFund was liable. In this case, for example,
fect its interests.
the pre-existing condition was not known
until after the settlement Under such con- 656 P.2d at 422, 423.
ditions, good reason exists to apply § 35-1[4 J The fundamental policy underlying
69(1) to settlements.
Paoli is that the intricate statutory pattern
[2] The law generally encourages set- governing the liabilities of the Fund to
tlements. Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust insurance carriers should be accorded due
Co. v. Travelstead, Utah, 592 P.2d 605, 607 protection by the procedural law, which
(1979); Reynolds v. Merrill 23 Utah 2d must assure fairness to the Fund and also
155, 460 P.2d 323 (1969). If we were to give effect to the basic statutory scheme
rule, as the Fund requests, that § 35-1- for allocating liability for the payment of
69(1) does not apply to settlements, then compensation. These principles control the
insurance companies and employers might liability of the Fund as much when a combe deterred from settling any case in which pensation payment is made pursuant to setreimbursement from the Fund might be an tlement as when an award is made after a
full dress hearing is conducted.
issue.
The Fund's back-up argument is that
In the instant case, Mr. Rhodes' pre-exeven if § 35-1-69(1) does apply to settle- isting back condition was latent and did not
ments, it applies only to settlements to manifest itself until after the settlement.
which th* Fund is a, pwty.
The record indicates that none of the set[3] An insurance carrier cannot always tling parties knew of the prior condition.
know at the outset of a workmen's compen- The medical report upon which the settling
sation case whether the Fund's interests parties relied stated that except for some
are or might be involved. In Paoli v. Cot- prior unrelated treatment in a V.A. hospitonwood Hospital Utah, 656 P.2d 420 tal, Rhodes' "past history is not otherwise
(1982), we held that if the Fund failed to significant." The Industrial Commission
receive proper notice in a workmen's com- stated in its denial of the motion for 4review
pensation case, then it could, "where neces- that at the time of the settlement, *[p]resary, compel the reopening of [a] hearing existing conditions were not indicated as a
to allow the Fund to submit evidence bear- part of the 20% permanent partial impairing upon its special interest and liability." ment."
Id. at 423. Thus, the Fund could be held
The Fund was notified at the earliest
liable for its statutory liabilities even after possible date of its potential liability aristhe completion of a hearing. The Fund is ing out of the settlement. The earliest
not insulated from its liabilities because the time the parties knew or even suspected
circumstances giving rise to those liabilities the existence of the pre-existing condition
were not foreseen. In Paoli the Court was when Mr. Rhodes applied for an instated:
crease in permanent partial disability.
The circumstances that alert the parOur ruling in this case is consistent with
ties ... to a potential payment from the the position taken by other states. AmeriSecond Injury Fund are, of course, ex- can Standard, Inc. v. Stephen, Ky.App..
ceptional, and sometimes will not appear 565 S.W.2d 158 (1978), held that a failure to
until the proceedings are underway. It include Kentucky's "Special Fund" as a
is therefore inexpedient to require the party to a settlement did not preclude joinFund to be a participant or even a party ing it in a later action for increased benein every proceeding before the Commis- fits. As here, the employee did not know
sion, and the statutes do not require this. of a pre-existing condition until after the
settlement. The court noted that the Spe-
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cial Fund had been notified as soon as
possible, stating:
Once the employee discovered the true
nature and extent of his disability, he
sought to make the Special Fund a party
at his first opportunity to do so.
Under these circumstances, where
there was no evidence that either party
withheld any information from the otherf,} . . . we find that the board correctly
reopened the award, made the Special
Fund a party, and apportioned the
award.
Id. at 162.
In Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v.
Alterman Foods, Inc., 162 Ga.App. 428,
291 S.E.2d 758 (1982), an employee settled
with the employer and later received an
additional award from an administrative
law judge. The employer sought reimbursement from the Georgia counterpart to
Utah's Second Injury Fund of all amounts
(apparently including the settlement) paid
after the injury had occurred. The Georgia
second injury fund sought to avoid liability
on the grounds that the prior proceedings
between the employee and the employer
were conclusive of the employer's right to
reimbursement The Georgia appellate
court ruled that although the employer had
not sought reimbursement in the prior proceeding, it had the right to do so now. See
also Arduser v. Daniel International
Corp., 7 Kan.App.2d 225, 640 P.2d 329
(1982) (special fund required to reimburse
insurer for an entire settlement). But see
Yocom v. Jordan Auto Parts Co., Ky„ 521
S.W.2d 519 (19T5) (reimbursement denied).
See generally 2 A. Larson, The Law of
Workmen's
Compensation
§ 59.31(f)
(1982).
We emphasize that in this case the employee, not the insurance carrier, sought to
reopen the case after settlement Therefore, this case does not necessarily mean
that an insurance carrier may seek reimbursement after settlement, unless the employee reopens the case to obtain additional
compensation for the same injury that was
the subject matter of the settlement

The Fund contends that no compensation
should be allowed Mr. Rhodes for his
chronic alcoholism. In effect, the Fund
requests affirmative relief by seeking a
reversal of the \7* increase in the permanent partial disability rating. The Fund
raises this issue for the first time in its
respondent's brief without having cross-petitioned for review. Moreover, the Fund
failed to raise the issue before the Commission. In the Fund's answer to State Insurance's motion to review the order of the
administrative law judge before the Commission, the Fund neither disputed the 4%
increase nor filed its own motion for review. Instead, the Fund in fact accepted
the increase by taking the position that the
"responsibility of the Second Injury Fund
for reimbursement should be Y24 . . . of any
medical expenses paid."
[5,6] Ordinarily questions not raised in
an administrative tribunal are not subject
to judicial review. E.g., Waikiki Resort
Hotel, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu, 63 Haw. 222, 624 P.2d 1353 (1981);
Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Commission, 84
Wash.2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974); 2 Am.
Jur.2d Administrative Law § 724 (1962);
73A CJ.S. Public Administrative Law
and Procedure § 191 (1983). Even though
that rule may not be applied in exceptional
cases, see cases cited at 73A CJ.S. Public
Administrative Law and Procedure § 191
n. 93 (1983), this is not such a case. The
Fund had full opportunity to raise the issue
of chronic alcoholism and failed to do so at
two critical junctions. No circumstances of
injustice compel review of the issue on
appeal. In declining to address the issue
on procedural grounds, we do not express
any view whatsoever on the merits of the
issue.
[7] In light of the above, we hold that
State Insurance is entitled to have an apportionment between it and the Fund of the
medical expenses, temporary total disability, and permanent partial disability payments it has paid to Mr. Rhodes. On remand, these payments should be appor-
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tioned in the customary way as required by
§ 35-1-69.
Reversed and remanded.
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
HALL, Chief Justice (Concurring and
Dissenting;):
I join the opinion of the Court, except the
portion thereof that declines to address the
contention of the Fund that no compensation shall be allowed Rhodes for his condition of chronic alcoholism.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Fund
did not seek reversal of that portion of the
award based upon chronic alcoholism, as a
matter of law, Rhodes is not entitled to
such an award.
This Court should exercise its prerogative to correct this obvious error in the
application of the law and should, upon
remand, order the reversal of the 4% increase in. the permanent partial disability
rating attributable to alcoholism.
HOWE, Justice (Concurring and Dissenting):
I dissent from that part of the majority
opinion which requires the Second Injury
Fund to reimburse the State Insurance
Fund for part of the monies paid out by it
under the settlement agreement of July 23,
1980. I agree that after Rhodes re-opened
his claim and the medical panel found that
part of his impairment was due to pre-existing conditions, the Second Injury Fund
should bear its proper proportion of compensation thereafter payable to Rhodes.
The Second Injury Fund was not a party
to the settlement agreement which was
entered into by Rhodes and the State Insurance Fund upon competent medical evidence then before them. I think it unfair
and unsupported by the law that the Second Injury Fund can now be made to bear
part of past payments since it did not participate in the making of the agreement
and there was no medical evidence then
available that it had any liability.

be authority that reimbursement should be
ordered under these circumstances. I have
no quarrel with American Standard Inc.
v. Stephen, Ky.App., 565 S.W„2d 158 (1978)
which permitted the Kentucky Special
Fund to be joined in a re-opened claim for
increased benefits. But there the Special
Fund was not ordered to bear any part of
the benefits already paid under the pnor
settlement to which it had noc been a party.
Likewise, in Subsequent Injury Trust
Fund v. Alterman Foods, 162 Ga^\pp.
428, 291 S.E.2d 758 (1982) it does not appear that the Subsequent Injury Fund was
required to reimburse the employer for any
funds it had paid out pursuant to a settlement to which it had not been a party.
The case holds that reimbursement could
be sought against the Subsequent Injury
Fund for monies paid out pursuant to an
award but by statute the Fund was protected from the res judicata effect of the
award to which it had not been a party. In
Arduser v. Daniel International Corp., 7
Kan.App.2d 225, 640 P.2d 329 (1982) it appears in the statement of facts that the
Kansas Workmen's Compensation Fund
was required to reimburse the employer
and its insurance carrier for certain
amounts but the question of reimbursement was not an issue in the case and is
not discussed in the court's opinion.
I do not agree with the majority that
denying reimbursement will discourage settlements. The settling parties are well protected since any of them may, as here.
re-open the claim when new medical evidence is found. The Second Injury Fund
may then be brought in and made u> bear
its proportion of future payments.

The cases cited by the majority in support of its position do not appear to me to
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(Not For Publication)

Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 890675-CA

*. :

Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah,
Respondent.
Before Judges Garff, Billings, and Davidson (On Law and Motion).

PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on the motion of
respondents Galigher Ash, Baker International/ and Aetna
Casualty and Surety (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Galigher Ash*) and on the court's own motion for summary
affirmance both on the basis that the appeal presents no
substantial question for consideration. This case is also
before the court on petitioner's motion for summary reversal.
We affirm the order of the Board of Review ("Board")/ and
dismiss the petition. R. Utah Ct. App. 10(a)(2).
Petitioner Merrill J. Bailey initially applied for
worker's compensation on or about August 4, 1986. A hearing on
the claim took place on November 13/ 1986. At that hearing,
Bailey claimed oil had been spilled in the vicinity of the
hydraulic press he was operating on June 28/ 1982/ and he
slipped in the oil and fell/ striking his buttocks on some
pipes. The employer's first report of injury indicated that an
accident occurred on June 30/ 1982 while Bailey was turning a
12" vac impeller over# and that he sustained a strain to his
back. Petitioner was treated by Dr. Norman Shore following the
injury. Dr. Shore's office notes indicated that he saw Bailey
on July 3/ 1982/ and his complaint was "low back strain
6-29-82/ 10:00 a.m. while lifting heavy machinery." The
medical records also indicated that as treatment for a
lumbrosacral strain# Bailey was given a lumbrosacral brace and
muscle relaxants. The results of a lumbrosacral x-ray were
negative. Bailey was paid temporary total compensation and
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returned to work on August 17, 1982, based on his doctor's
release. Bailey contended at the November 1986 hearing that
both the employer's report of injury and Dr. Shore's medical
records 'were incorrect in describing the June 1982 accident as
a; lifting'accident. Evidence presented at the hearing also
ibdicat2d^that Bailey slipped and fell on oil in the vicinity
of his1 piess on December 5, 1977. Bailey maintained, however,
that the'Injury described as occurring on December 5, 1977
actually'occurred on June 30, 1982.
Ba-ilcy continued to work for Galigher Ash from August of
J.982 un-til October of 1983 when he was laid off. In August of
JUJS5, lie* sought medical treatment for problems with his legs
a.nd back, and it was discovered that Bailey had a syrinx on his
s;?ine. 'In December 1985, he underwent surgery to place a shunt
in his back for the purpose of draining fluid off his spinal
column. As of August 6, 1985, Bailey was found to be
permanently disabled by the Social Security Administration.
In a decision dated November 21, 1986, the administrative
law judge found, in relevant part:
Having had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the applicant and his witness,
and considering the employer's first report
and the report of Dr. Shore, I can only
conclude that the applicant is not telling
the truth with respect to the events of June
30, 1982. Therefore, I conclude that he
sustained an injury on June 30, 1982 but
that injury was a back strain as diagnosed
by Dr. Norman Shore, and that the
applicant's injury of June 30, 1982 did not
consist of a slip and fall.

The applicant offered voluminous testimonial
evidence concerning the presence of the
symptoms he has been having. However, he
has offered no medical evidence of a causal
connection between the sprain of June 30,
1982 from which the applicant fully
recovered as of August 16, 1982 and the
applicant's subsequent syrinx, which was
discovered in late 1985.
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[T]he Administrative Law Judge can only
conclude that he sustained a simple back
s t r a i n on June 30, 1982, from which he
recovered and was released to return to work
on August 17, 1982. The applicant then
worked for over another year, at which time
he was laid off due to a reduction in
f o r c e . He then c o l l e c t e d s i x (6) months of
unemployment benefits in 1984, and also
worked for approximately three (3) months
f o r Bechtel D r i l l i n g Corporation. Once his
s y r i n x became symptomatic, the applicant had.
an increase in symptoms, and f i n a l l y sought
medical treatment in August of 1985. There
being no evidence in the f i l e to support a
causal connection between a low back sprain
and a c e r v i c a l and thoracic syrinx which was
found some three (3) years l a t e r , I must
conclude that the applicant has failed to
meet his burden of proof.
F i n a l l y , there i s no evidence in the f i l e of
any permanent impairment due to the
i n d u s t r i a l accident of June 30, 1982.
Based on t h e foregoing findings of f a c t , the administrative law
judge concluded that Bailey had f a i l e d to meet his burden of
proof - e s t a b l i s h i n g that he i s e n t i t l e d to additional temporary
t o t a l compensation, medical expenses or permanent impairment as
a r e s u l t of the industrial accident of June 30, 1982.- The
Board affirmed and adopted the adminstrative law judge's
d e c i s i o n on December IS, 1986. Bailey then f i l e d a p e t i t i o n
for w r i t of review with t h i s court, but that petition was
d i s m i s s e d on March 16, 1987 because i t was not timely f i l e d
pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 8 3 .
On May 9, 1989, Bailey f i l e d another application for
hearing w i t h the Industrial Commission concerning an accident
o c c u r r i n g on June 30, 1982. This second application described
t h e a c c i d e n t as a l i f t i n g accident, rather than a s l i p and f a l l
and sought permanent and t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y benefits. Galigher
Ash f i l e d a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of res
j u d i c a t a , which was granted by the administrative law judge on
J u l y 28/ 1989 and affirmed by the Board on October 26, 1989.
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law judge concluded that "[a] present claim
t h a t t h e s y r i n x has resulted in permanent total d i s a b i l i t y must
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f a i l where the causal link between the injury and the syrinx
has p r e v i o u s l y been adjudicated." The present p e t i t i o n for
w r i t of review i s from the 1989 proceedings*
These proceedings were commenced after January 1, 1988, and
t h u s our review i s governed by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) of
t h e Ut«Ix-Administrative Procedures Act.
Section
6 3 - 4 6 b - i 6 ( 4 ) (d) provides, in relevant part, that an a p p e l l a t e
c o u r t s n a i l grant r e l i e f where a person seeking review has been
c u t s t a n t i a i l y prejudiced because "the agency has erroneously
' i n t e r p r e t e d or applied the law." We must determine i f the
Commission erred in dismissing the 1989 p e t i t i o n on the b a s i s
o:c r e s j u d i c a t a .
The d o c t r i n e of res judicata i s a v a i l a b l e in worker's
compensation m a t t e r s . See Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law
§ 7 9 . 7 2 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . Application of res judicata must, however, be
harmonized w i t h the continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Industrial
Commission i n workers compensation to reopen cases and modify
awards. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (1988) provides, in relevant
p a r t , t h a t " [ t ] h e powers and j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Commission
over each c a s e s h a l l be continuing, and i t may from time to
time make such modification or change with respect to formal
f i n d i n g s , or -orders with respect t h e r e t o , as in i t s opinion may
be j u s t i f i e d .
The Utah Supreme Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y
i n t e r p r e t e d the foregoing language to require "as the basis of
m o d i f i c a t i o n , evidence of some s i g n i f i c a n t change or new
development in the claimant's injury or proof of the previous
award's inadequacy.- Buston v. Industrial Commission. 587 P.2d
1 2 1 , 123 (Utah 1978); £&£ also Soencer v. Industrial
Commission, 733 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1987) (per curiam). In
Buxton and Soencer, the Commission's o r i g i n a l order found a
s u b s t a n t i a l permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y based on a causal
c o n n e c t i o n between an industrial accident and the claimant's
injury.
In each c a s e , the Utah Supreme Count held the
Commission erred by refusing to modify the award based on
s u b s e q u e n t evidence that the employee was not employable and
c o u l d not be r e h a b i l i t a t e d . These c a s e s are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e
from c a s e s such as the present one where no causal r e l a t i o n
between t h e i n j u r y and the i n d u s t r i a l accident has ever been
e s t a b l i s h e d . The finding of lack of causation i s res judicata
i n a subsequent claim for recovery based on the same accident
and i n j u r y . S££, flj^L-/ Huohev v. I n d u s t r i a l Commission, 394
N.E.2d 1164 ( 1 1 1 . 1979); Reddel v. I n d u s t r i a l Commission, 131
A r i z App. 263, 640 P.2d 194 (Ariz App. 1982); Govan v.
I n d u s t r i a l Commission, 23 Ariz. App. 261, 532 P.2d 533 (Ariz.
App. 1 9 7 5 ) .
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In the case now before us, Galigher Ash contends that "the
prior adjudication in this case involved the same injuries as
are alleged in this case." Bailey counters that the second
application differs from the original one because he-uow claims
a lifting accident rather than a slip and fall and he* 'now
claims permanent disability. He interprets the administrative
law judge's 1986 decision as concluding that he had notsustained his burden of proving that a slip and fall]occurred
and states that the 'accident claimed in the May 9, 193S
application was "the accident and injury that was on the
records instead of the alleged slip and fall accident*.. This
case is similar to Houser v. Southern Idaho Pioe & Sb**!. Inc.
649 P.2d 1197 (Idaho 1982). The claimant in that caca alleged
a knee injury and in the course of the hearing, contended that',
he had sustained back injuries on two occasions when Iiis knee
went out. He appealed from the Industrial Commission's order
that his condition had stabilized/ resulting in a 10% permanent
partial impairment. During the pendency of the appeal,
claimant filed a second complaint alleging an injury to his
back as a result of the knee injury and seeking additional
compensation. The employer made a motion to dismiss on the
basis that the back injury had already been considered. The
Commission granted the motion and claimant appealed. The Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that "the proceeding in the
instant case and in the prior proceeding arose out of the same
operative facts between the same parties" and holding that the
second application was properly dismissed on the basis of res
judicata.
In the present case, Bailey initially contended he slipped
and fell on June 30, 1982, and disputed the reports by his
employer and doctor indicating that he was injured in a lifting
accident, resulting in a back strain from which he fully
recovered. The administrative law judge concluded that the
accident was a lifting accident, and further concluded that no
causal connection had been established between the compensable
lifting accident and the syrinx. Petitioner presented no
medical testimony in the 1986 hearing. Instead, petitioner's
counsel argued that the onset of symptoms after the accident
was in itself sufficient to establish prima facie causation and
require submission to a medical panel, which the administrative
law judge declined to do on the basis that there was no
conflicting medical evidence. That decision became final with
the dismissal of the original petition for review by this court.
Petitioner attached a letter written by his treating
physician and dated in December 1986 (one month after the
original hearing) to his 1989 request for hearing. In the 1989
decision, the administrative law judge noted "for the sake of
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discussion,- that the letter from claimant*s doctors was not
sufficient to establish medical causation because it states, in
part, that - [i] t would be impossible . • • to attribute the
fall as"co the origin of his syringomyelia."1 Our review of
the record and the 1986 decision leads us to conclude that any
cLoira routing to injury from a June 30, 1982 accident has been
fully adjudicated by the Commission. The claim that the June
30, 1982"accident caused the syringomyelia is now barred by res
judicata/'and the Commission did not err in dismissing the
petition.?r
We a'ffirra the Board's order and dismiss the petition.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

1. The letter goes on to suggest that "it is possible that Mr.
Bailey has had a small, asymptomatic syrinx within his spinal
cord for many years that with repeated heavy lifting and
straining may have gradually enlarged, eventually producing his
weakness and spasticity.* Appellant did not make this claim in
either his 1986 nor his 1989 requests for benefits.
2. Much of petitioner's argument concerns alleged
misrepreseantation by his former attorney about the status of
his first petition for judical review. He contends that his
attorney led him to believe that his petition was pending when
it had actually been dismissed as untimely some eighteen months
earlier. Although we would not condone such conduct, it does
not support a different result in this case.
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